Autonomous offensive — live targets
ImplementedRAVEN — Verified pentest
Against a live endpoint: discovers the web / network / TLS surface and detects a broad range of classes — and, distinctively, re-derives and verifies each finding from the recorded exchange before reporting it.
Family facts
- Code
- FAM-PENTEST-WEB
- Status
- ready — code maturity
- Availability
- available — whether it is offerable
- Ingest
- live — how a target enters
- Rules of Engagement
- Required (acts on a live target)
- Kind
- Family (a selectable assessment)
What it decides
Whether a specific vulnerability is actually exploitable — demonstrated by an observed, unforgeable server-side state change, not inferred from a pattern.
How it works
RAVEN is a profile of the shared autonomous agent: it discovers the surface, forms a hypothesis about a class (say, command injection), and selects a probe ordered by information gain — but only after the tool gate authorizes it. The probe is sent against the live endpoint and the response is captured.
Each vulnerability class has a validator that confirms only on a postcondition that cannot be faked, re-derived from the actual request/response: a one-time nonce echoed by an injected command, a boundary-anchored template result absent from the baseline, an out-of-band collaborator that received a server-side request. RAVEN never authors a finding itself — a confirmed validator result becomes a promotable verifier result and the membrane decides. Anything undecided is retained as UNVERIFIABLE, never reported.
A worked example
For OS command injection, a benign `echo <nonce>` whose output appears while the literal payload does not proves execution; a follow-up identity command confirms it. Reflected XSS is the one honest exception: unescaped reflection into an HTML sink is proven, but script execution is labelled inference because no browser is run.
Declared limits
Missions are web-audit / tls-audit / exploit-check (verify-over-tool + membrane). Frontier reasoning and the agentic offense loop do not run against real external targets — that is lab-only (see NEMESIS). “Zero false positives” is a design property (no proof ⇒ no finding), not a measured rate; GraphQL/SOAP/WebSocket adapters prove only a subset today.
References
- [1]OWASP Web Security Testing Guide
- [2]MITRE CWE
- [3]Out-of-band (OOB) interaction technique
References point to public, well-known technical sources for further study.
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